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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kasey A. Smith was convicted of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen years of age.
He raises two issues on appeal.   First,  he challenges the district  court’s denial  of his motion to
suppress, arguing his confession was not voluntary due to coercive and deceptive interview
tactics.  Second, he argues the district court erred in concluding he breached his plea agreement
with the State by refusing to answer the polygraph examiner’s questions regarding the
supposedly deceptive responses he provided during the polygraph examination.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Smith was charged by Information with one count of lewd conduct with a child under
sixteen years of age, based on an allegation that he fondled the vaginal area of his stepdaughter
in May 2013, when she was seven or eight years old.  (R., pp.25-30; 72-73.)  The victim had
disclosed during a counseling session that Mr. Smith touched her vaginal area while he was
helping her and her younger step-sister take a shower.  (R., p.36.)  Mr. Smith was interviewed in
September 2013, and again in October 2013, and denied the allegations.  (See K.Smith.pt.1;
K.Smith.pt.2; Fort Hall PD Documents, pp.21, 22.)  Mr. Smith was interviewed again on
December 18, 2013 by Officer Kelley, who used a Computer Voice Stress Analysis (CVSA) test.
(R., p.354; 4/17/14 Tr., p.3, L.13 – p.4, L.3; p.6, Ls.4-9; 3/30/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.4-12.)  Mr. Smith
confessed to possibly touching his stepdaughter’s vagina while helping her dry off after a
shower, but never admitted to intentionally placing his fingers in his stepdaughter’s vagina.  (See
generally Ex. 2.)
Mr. Smith filed a motion to suppress challenging the admissibility of his supposed
“confession,” and a motion to dismiss challenging the finding of probable cause.  (R., pp.171-73,
2174-76, 341-42, 349-52.)  He argued he was subjected to coercive and deceptive tactics during
the December 18, 2013 interview and was manipulated into confessing, relying on State v.
Valero, 153 Idaho 910 (2012).  (R., pp.174-75, 350.)  An audio recording of the interview was
admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.  (3/30/16 Tr., p.2, Ls.6-13, p.4, L.21 – p.5,
L.5; Ex. 2.)  The district court denied both motions, concluding Mr. Smith’s confession was
knowing and voluntary, and the State submitted sufficient evidence to bind the case over to the
district court. (R., pp.353-60.)
Following the district court’s decision, the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to
which Mr. Smith agreed to plead guilty to felony injury to a child, as charged in an Amended
Information, and the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three years
fixed,  and  to  recommend  a  rider  if  a  psychosexual  evaluation  and  a  full  disclosure  polygraph
revealed there were no other victims, and Mr. Smith presented either a low or moderate risk to
reoffend.  (R., pp.356-66, 367-73; 6/13/16 Tr., p.1, L.8 – p.2, L.1.)  The plea agreement states:
1. The State will amend the charge to Felony Injury to Child.
2. The State will recommend an underlying sentence of 3 and 7.
3. The Defendant will complete a Psycho-sexual evaluation with a full
disclosure polygraph (PSE).
4. If the PSE returns with no other hands on victims and low to moderate risk
to re-offend, the Stat[e] will concur in the PSI with no more than a rider.
If not, the State can argue for imposition of sentence.
5. Defendant can argue for any sentence.
(R., p.373.)  The district court accepted Mr. Smith’s guilty plea after confirming he was
reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress.  (6/13/16 Tr., p.2, Ls.5-
12; p.5, Ls.14-18; p.8, Ls.12-16.)
Mr. Smith appeared for sentencing on August 15, 2016.  (R., pp.383-84.)  At the
beginning of the hearing, the prosecutor expressed concern about whether the State was still
bound by the plea agreement in light of the fact that Mr. Smith took a polygraph examination and
3his results were determined to be deceptive.  (R., pp.383, 387; 8/15/16 Tr., p.34, Ls.8-23.)
Counsel for Mr. Smith first argued the State was still bound by the plea agreement.  (8/15/16
Tr., p.36, Ls.17-22.)  Counsel then said, “I don’t know if [the plea agreement is] breached, but it
may not be enforceable.  So one option is to have [Mr. Smith] do another polygraph.”  (8/15/16
Tr., p.36, L.25 – p.37, L.3.)  The district court continued the sentencing hearing.  (8/15/16
Tr., p.37, Ls.14-15; R., p.383.)  On August 18, 2016, the district court issued a written order,
concluding Mr. Smith breached the plea agreement, and the State was therefore free to argue for
any sentence.  (R., pp.386-89.)
At  the  continued  sentencing  hearing,  the  State  recommended  a  unified  sentence  of  ten
years, with four years fixed, without a period of retained jurisdiction.  (8/22/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-
24.)  Counsel for Mr. Smith recommended a unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed,
either suspended or with a period of retained jurisdiction.  (8/22/16 Tr., p.2, Ls.13-14; p.4, L.25 –
p.5, L.22; p.7, Ls.7-21.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Smith to a unified term of ten years,
with three years fixed, and did not retain jurisdiction.  (8/22/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-15.)  The
judgment was entered on August 23, 2016, and Mr. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal on
September 15, 2016.1  (R., pp.391-94, 396-99.)
1 Mr. Smith filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) on September 15,
2016, asking the district court to reconsider the sentence.  (R., pp.408-09.)  The district court did
not rule on Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion.  Mr. Smith does not raise an issue with respect to his
Rule 35 motion in light of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2006).
4ISSUES
I. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Smith’s motion to suppress?
II. Did the district court err in concluding Mr. Smith breached the plea agreement, thereby
relieving the State of its obligation to recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed?
5ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Smith’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Mr. Smith’s so-called confession was not voluntary due to Officer Kelley’s coercive and
deceptive interview tactics.  Officer Kelley did not provide Mr. Smith with adequate warnings
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not allow Mr. Smith to call his wife
when he asked to do so, and repeatedly overstated the reliability of the CVSA test and the
importance of Mr. Smith accepting responsibility for his conduct, which he said was
“undeniable” based on the results of the CVSA test.  Despite repeated, pointed questioning,
Mr. Smith never admitted to intentionally touching his stepdaughter’s vagina, and only admitted
that he might have done so inadvertently while helping her dry off after a shower after being fed
those  facts  by  the  officer.   Mr.  Smith’s  confession  was  not  voluntary,  and  should  have  been
suppressed.
B. Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,
the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted).   “This  Court  will  accept  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  unless  they  are  clearly
erroneous.  However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted).  “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
6C. Mr. Smith’s Confession Was Not Voluntary Due To Officer Kelley’s Deceptive And
Coercive Interview Tactics
“The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a noncustodial interrogation might
in some situations, by virtue of some special circumstance, be characterized as one where a
defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily.” State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635, 638
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) and State v. Troy,
124 Idaho 211, 214 (Ct App. 1993)).  “To determine whether a confession is voluntary, a court
must examine the totality of the circumstances and ask whether the defendant’s will was
overborne by police conduct.” State v. Brown, 160 Idaho 635, 637 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations
omitted).  “If, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s free will was overborne by
threats, through direct or implied promises or other forms of coercion, then the statement is not
voluntary and is inadmissible.” Id. (citations omitted).  While deception or trickery does not
automatically make a confession involuntary, “a court must weigh the deception or trickery
against such circumstances as the defendant’s knowledge of his right to remain silent and his
apparent ability to make a rational decision.” State v. Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 808 (Ct. App.
1997) (citations omitted).  “When a defendant alleges an interrogation to be coercive, the State
bears the burden of proving voluntariness of the defendant’s confession by a preponderance of
the evidence.” Brown, 160 Idaho at 637 (citations omitted).
The State cannot meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
Mr. Smith’s confession was voluntary.  Officer Kelley repeatedly emphasized the accuracy of
the CVSA test throughout his interview with Mr. Smith.2  He first explained to Mr. Smith, “One
2 As Officer Kelley explained it at the suppression hearing, the purpose of the CVSA test is to
record stress responses to questions.  (4/17/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.22-25.)  The audio recording of the
interview reflects  that,  in  conducting  the  CVSA test,  Officer  Kelley  asked  a  series  of  “yes”  or
“no” questions to Mr. Smith and purported to measure the stress reflected in his voice when
7thing you’ve got to understand is this instrument is extremely accurate.”  (Ex. 2, 4:47-4:55.)  He
continued, “There are differences when people tell the truth and when they lie.  So if you lie, I’m
going to know it.”  (Ex. 2, 4:56-5:10.)  After performing the CVSA test, Officer Kelley reviewed
the results with Mr. Smith and said, “This tells me you made a mistake, and you touched [your
stepdaughter] inappropriately.”  (Ex. 2, 20:30-37)  Officer Kelley would not accept Mr. Smith’s
repeated denials.  He said, “It’s not deniable.  This is proof positive to me.”  (Ex. 2, 22:40-44.)
After repeatedly denying any wrongful conduct, Mr. Smith said he might have grabbed
his stepdaughter the wrong way—inadvertently touching her vaginal area—when he was getting
her out of the car.  (Ex. 2, 25:05-30.)  At that point, Mr. Smith asked to “get [his] wife on the
phone.”  (Ex. 2, 26:40-43.)  The officer said they could “see if they could call” her after “we . . .
get this taken care of.”  (Ex. 2, 26:44-54.)  The officer did not attempt to call Mr. Smith’s wife,
and did not stop the interrogation so that Mr. Smith could call his wife.  He continued to question
Mr. Smith, and continued to tell Mr. Smith that his conduct of touching his stepdaughter’s vagina
“is undeniable.”  (Ex. 2, 27:29-49.)
Officer Kelley emphasized repeatedly to Mr. Smith that it would be best for him to accept
responsibility.   He  said,  “The  fact  remains  though,  Kasey,  we’ve  got  to  get  this  taken  care  of.
And, you know, it’s going to be a lot better . . . for me to say Kasey made a mistake but he wants
to fix it, rather than Kasey’s lying to me and he won’t come clean.”  (Ex. 2, 28:44-29:08.)
Mr. Smith asked to take the CVSA test over again, and Officer Kelley responded, “There’s no
reason for me to give the test again.  It shows; it’s there; you’re telling me it’s there.”  (Ex. 2,
30:25-48.)  Mr. Smith asked what was going to happen, and Officer Kelley answered, “If you
responding.  (See generally Ex. 2.)  The officer explained to Mr. Smith that he performed the test
twice because any situational anxiety from the testing “always” goes away the second time for
people who are telling the truth.  (Ex. 2, 15:52-16:23.)
8step up and take responsibility for it, that never, never hurts somebody, it always helps.”  (Ex. 2,
32:00-10.)  Officer Kelley continued, “If I’ve got this test saying it absolutely shows me that this
happened, but he refused to do anything to help it out, then they don’t have any other recourse
then to maybe impose the maximum.”  (Ex. 2, 32:39-56.)  Officer Kelley told Mr. Smith he’d
interviewed “hundreds of people in the same situation you’re in” and “not one of them has been
worse off by taking responsibility.”  (Ex. 2, 33:28-40.)
After 34 minutes of questioning, Officer Kelley again asked Mr. Smith to “tell [him]
what happened.”  (Ex. 2, 34:08-12.)  Mr. Smith again said the only time he might have touched
his stepdaughter’s vagina was when he took her out of the car.  (Ex. 2, 34:12-30.)  Officer Kelley
then provided Mr. Smith with the answer he was looking for—he said it was something where
she  was  fully  awake,  and  “it  was  probably  in  a  setting  .  .  .  it  was  in  a  setting  where  she  was
getting out of a tub . . . or something like that.”  (Ex. 2, 35:08-30.)  The officer refused to accept
the car incident as explaining the “level of stress” Mr. Smith showed on the CVSA test, and said,
“There’s more to it there.”  (Ex. 2, 35:40-47.)  He continued, “I bet . . . it happened because of an
urge, and you automatically, immediately, felt guilty about it, remorseful about it and regretted
that it happened.”  (Ex. 2, 36:20-37.)  Mr. Smith told Officer Kelley, “I’m trying to tell the truth
and you’re acting like I’m not.”  (Ex.2, 38:15-20.)
The following exchange took place after 40 minutes of questioning:
Q: So, did it happen at 1550 Yellowstone when you’re staying there, um,
when you were showering them, or getting them dressed, or anything.  I
mean,  it  happened  somewhere,  and  I  just  need  to  .  .  .  it’s  somewhat
important where it happened.
A: I’m thinking it had to happen . . . during when I was showering them.
. . .
9A:  I  might have, I  can’t  remember if  I  was drying her off,  and I  might have
tried to get her legs and all, and that’s probably when.
Q: Well, and this [test] tells me that . . . your finger went into her vagina.
A: Like when I was drying her off.
Q: Okay.
A: That’s the only thing I can think of.
(Ex. 2, 40:30-41:40.)  The questioning concluded after 50 minutes.  Mr. Smith never admitted to
intentionally placing his fingers in his stepdaughter’s vagina.  He also never admitted he was
acting on any urge, despite the officer’s repeated suggestions to that effect.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Smith’s confession was not voluntary.
As an initial matter, it is not clear from the record that Mr. Smith understand his Miranda rights.
Mr. Smith was not given verbal Miranda warnings at any point, but signed a one-page form
consenting to a truth verification examination at the beginning of the interview.  (Exs., p.2)
Officer Kelley acknowledged at the suppression hearing that there was no separate Miranda
waiver.  (3/30/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-13; p.24, L.18 – p.25, L.4.)  The audio recording of the
interview does not reflect that there was any discussion of the form Mr. Smith signed.  (See
generally Ex. 2.)  The form states, in pertinent part:
I, Kasey A. Smith, D.O.B. have been advised by Lieutenant Cliff
Kelley of the Pocatello Poli nt  that  I  DO NOT HAVE TO TAKE A
TRUTH VERIFICATION EXAMINATION!  I fully realize that the person
giving this examination is not requiring me to take this examination, that I may
remain silent the entire time I am here, anything I say may be used against me in
any  court  of  law,  I  may  first  consult  with  an  attorney  or  anyone  I  wish  before
either signing this form or being interviewed or taking this examination.  I
understand that I may exercise any of these rights at any time during the time I am
here.  Nevertheless, I consent to the use of electronic hearing and recording
devices, and I voluntarily request and authorize the representative of the Pocatello
Police Department to now proceed with the interview/examination.
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(Exs., p.2.)  When Mr. Smith arguably sought to exercise his Miranda rights by contacting his
wife during the interview, the officer did not contact his wife, and did not offer to stop the
interview.  Mr. Smith could not reasonably have believed at this point that he had a right to
remain silent.
Officer  Kelley’s  questioning  of  Mr.  Smith  was  just  as  problematic  as  the Miranda
waiver.3  The CVSA test is not the reliable, scientific instrument that Officer Kelley portrayed it
to be. See, e.g., People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8, 405 N.E.2d 188, 190-91 (1980) (discussing
the lack of scientific reliability of voice stress testing); see also United States v. Traficant, 566 F.
Supp. 1046, 1047 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (noting “[s]everal studies revealed that [voice stress] testing
results yielded an accuracy rate only slightly higher than, and in some cases lower than, chance
expectancy rates).  The district court discounted the test’s lack of reliability, noting the State did
not intend to introduce the test result itself as evidence.  (R., p.357.)  But this view is
shortsighted, as it fails to account for the fact that a suspect may feel compelled to confess based
on fake science, especially where the questioner repeatedly emphasizes the importance of
accepting responsibility.  Mr. Smith denied again and again that he touched his stepdaughter’s
vagina, but the officer would not accept his denials.  At one point, Mr. Smith asked to take the
CVSA test again, apparently believing the officer that the test undeniably showed deception, but
the officer refused.  Officer Kelley knew he needed Mr. Smith to admit to touching his
stepdaughter’s vagina when drying her off after a shower, as that is what she reported, and
ultimately  fed  Mr.  Smith  these  exact  “facts”  in  order  to  elicit  his  confession.   Mr.  Smith
3 The  consent  form  Mr.  Smith  signed  did  not  notify  him  he  had  a  right  to  the  presence  of  an
attorney, either retained or appointed, as Miranda requires. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, but
Mr.  Smith  did  not  challenge  the  adequacy  of  the Miranda warnings themselves in the district
court, and Mr. Smith does not raise this as a separate issue on appeal.
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confessed after repeatedly being told he must accept responsibility, and would be better off for
doing so.
In State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910 (Ct. App. 2012), the Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress, agreeing that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the incriminating statements made by the defendant during an interrogation were
not voluntary. Id. at 916.  The defendant in Valero initially denied the allegations against him,
but confessed after a detective administered a polygraph examination. Id. at 914, 916.  Among
other things, the detective conveyed to the defendant that “the polygraph was determinative of
his guilt” despite the defendant’s attempt to deny the accusations against him. Id. at 914.  The
Court recognized that “the police are allowed to make misrepresentations to elicit confessions;
however, acceptance wanes when the police misrepresent the law.” Id.  The Court stated that
“[p]romises made by law enforcement officers without the authority to fulfill such promises may
render a confession involuntary.” Id. at 915 (citation omitted).
The facts of this case are not the same as Valero, but Mr. Smith’s “confession” is equally
problematic—perhaps even more so as it was based on a CVSA test rather than a polygraph test.
As discussed above, Officer Kelley overemphasized the reliability of the CVSA test, telling
Mr. Smith the test “is extremely accurate,” and the test result “is proof positive to me,” and
“absolutely shows me this happened.”  (Ex. 2, 4:47-4:55, 22:40-44, 32:39-56.)  The officer
would not accept Mr. Smith’s repeated denials, told him he would be better off if he accepted
responsibility in light of the test result, and ultimately fed him the “facts” he was looking for to
elicit his confession.  This conduct was coercive, and resulted in a confession that should have
been suppressed.
12
II.
The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Smith Breached The Plea Agreement, Thereby
Relieving The State Of Its Obligation To Recommend A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With
Three Years Fixed
A. Introduction
Pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, Mr. Smith agreed to “complete a Psycho-sexual
evaluation with a full disclosure polygraph.”  (R., p.373.)  The State agreed to “recommend an
underlying sentence of 3 and 7.”  (R., p.373.)  The State also agreed to “concur in the PSI with
no more than a rider” if the psychosexual evaluation and polygraph “return[ed] with no other
hands on victims and low to moderate risk to re-offend.”  (R., p.373.)  Mr. Smith did not breach
the plea agreement when, after completing a four-hour polygraph examination, he refused to
answer the polygraph examiner’s questions regarding his supposedly deceptive responses.
Instead, the fact that Mr. Smith’s responses indicated deception regarding whether or not there
were other victims, among other things, relieved the State of its obligation to recommend a rider.
The  district  court  erred  in  concluding  Mr.  Smith  breached  the  plea  agreement.   Relying  on  the
district court’s erroneous conclusion, the State breached the plea agreement when it
recommended a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed.  As a result of the State’s
breach  of  the  plea  agreement,  Mr.  Smith  is  entitled  to  either  be  resentenced  before  a  different
judge, or withdraw his guilty plea.
B. Standard Of Review
“Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this
Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards.” State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73
(2005) (citations omitted).  Mr. Smith has the burden of proving the State breached the plea
agreement. See State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2013).  “In determining whether
13
the state has breached a plea agreement, a court must examine the language of the plea
agreement and, where the language of that plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall
be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citations omitted).  “If the language of the document
is unambiguous, given its ordinary and well-understood meaning, we will not look beyond the
four corners of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties.” Id.
C. Mr. Smith Did Not Breach The Plea Agreement When, After Completing A Four-Hour
Polygraph Examination, He Refused To Answer The Examiner’s Questions Regarding
His Supposedly Deceptive Responses
Mr. Smith agreed, pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, to complete a psychosexual
evaluation with a full disclosure polygraph.  (R., p.373.)  Mr. Smith fulfilled his obligation when
he completed a psychosexual evaluation with licensed forensic psychologist Robert Lisota, and a
four-hour polygraph examination with L. Alex Hamilton, a certified forensic polygraph
examiner.4  (Conf. Exs., pp.72, 73-99.)  Mr. Smith did not breach the plea agreement when, after
completing the polygraph examination, he refused to answer Mr. Hamilton’s questions regarding
his supposedly deceptive responses.  Instead, the fact that Mr. Smith’s responses indicated
deception regarding whether or not there were other victims, among other things, relieved the
State of its obligation to “concur in the PSI with no more than a rider.”  (R., p.373.)
Mr. Hamilton’s confidential polygraph investigation report is included in the Confidential
Exhibits available to this Court, and was reviewed by the district court.  (Conf. Exs., pp.67-72;
R., p.387, n.1.)  Mr. Hamilton’s report reflects that Mr. Smith completed the polygraph portion
of the examination, and provided deceptive responses to the following questions:
4 Mr. Hamilton first attempted to give a polygraph examination to Mr. Smith on July 4, 2016, but
Mr. Smith “was not cooperating and not answering the questions” at that time.  (Conf. Exs.,
pp.69-70.)  Mr. Smith told Mr. Hamilton he “did not want to continue with the interview.”
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(1)  As an adult, have you ever participated in any sexual contact with a minor
that you are not telling me about?
(2)  In the past, have you touched [the victim’s] vagina more than one time?
(3) In your past, do you have any sexual victims that you are not telling me
about?
(Conf. Exs., p.71.)  Mr. Hamilton confronted Mr. Smith with his supposedly deceptive responses
during the post-test interview, and Mr. Smith said he was not going to speak with Mr. Hamilton.
(Conf. Exs., pp.71-72.)  Mr. Hamilton’s report states, in pertinent part:
During the post-test interview, I elicited the following information:
1. Kasey’s responses to the polygraph examination indicated significant
response and deception was indicated to the relevant questions.  When
confronting Kasey about his deceptive responses, Kasey said he was no
longer going to speak with me and the polygraph exam ended.
(Conf. Exs., pp.71-72.)  Despite Mr. Hamilton’s statement that “the polygraph exam ended,” it is
clear that Mr. Smith completed the polygraph portion of the examination.  Mr. Hamilton’s report
states, in pertinent part:
A  test  was  administered  using  a  fully  computerized  polygraph  instrument  .  .  .  .
The polygraph examination data indicated that test data was of adequate
interpretable quality, with normal response amplitude and the examination was
sufficiently free of artifacts and distorted segments to be interpretable according
to standardized criteria.  Numerical scoring and grading consistent with nationally
standardized procedures evaluated the examination.  The procedures resulted in
the findings of:  Significant Response Indicated/Deception Indicated . . . .
(Conf. Exs., p.72.)  Dr. Lisota’s report also reflects that Mr. Smith completed the polygraph
examination, but “did not pass.”  (Conf. Exs., p.74.)  Dr. Lisota states in his report:
Mr. Smith was not cooperative with L. Alex Hamilton when first contacted to do
his polygraph, and only grudgingly cooperative [sic] on the second attempt.  He
did not pass the polygraph, raising concerns that he was not forthcoming
regarding the true extent and nature of his problematic sexual behaviors.  When
confronted by Mr. Hamilton on his apparent deception during the polygraph,
Mr. Smith “shut down” and would no longer speak with Mr. Hamilton.
(Conf. Exs., p.70.)  Mr. Smith completed the polygraph examination with Mr. Hamilton on
July 10, 2016.  (Conf. Exs., p.72.)
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(Conf. Exs., p.74.)
Pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, Mr. Smith was obligated to “complete a Psycho-
sexual evaluation with a full disclosure polygraph (PSE),” but he was not obligated to complete a
post-polygraph interrogation.  (R., p.373.)  Mr. Smith fulfilled his obligation under the
agreement.  The fact that he provided deceptive answers to the relevant questions during the
course of the polygraph examination, and refused to discuss those answers with the examiner,
does not mean he breached the agreement.  To the extent the plea agreement is ambiguous
regarding the meaning of “completing” a polygraph examination, such ambiguity must be
resolved in Mr. Smith’s favor. See Acuna, 154 Idaho at 141.  The plea agreement relieved the
State of recommending a rider if there were other victims or if Mr. Smith presented more than a
moderate risk of reoffending.  Based on Mr. Smith’s deception on the polygraph and based on
the results of the psychosexual evaluation, the State was not obligated to recommend a rider, but
the plea agreement was not invalidated as a whole.  The State was still obligated to recommend a
unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  The district court erred in concluding
Mr. Smith breached the plea agreement, thereby relieving the State of this obligation.
D. The State Breached The Plea Agreement When It Recommended A Unified Sentence Of
Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed, And, As A Result, Mr. Smith Is Entitled To Either Be
Resentenced Before A Different Judge, Or To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Relying on the district court’s erroneous conclusion that it was relieved of its obligations
under the plea agreement, the State recommended the district court sentence Mr. Smith to a
unified term of ten years, with four years fixed.  (8/22/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-24.)  By making this
recommendation, the State breached its obligation under the plea agreement to “recommend an
underlying sentence of 3 and 7.”  (R., p.373.)  Because the district court concluded Mr. Smith
breached the plea agreement, thereby relieving the State of its obligations under the agreement,
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Mr. Smith did not argue in the district court that the State breached the plea agreement by
recommending a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed.  Even if Mr. Smith could
have raised this issue in the district court, he was not required to do so in order to preserve the
issue for appeal.  This Court has held that a claim that the State breached a plea agreement
asserts fundamental error that can be raised for the first time on appeal because it “goes to the
foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights.” See Jafek, 141 Idaho at 74.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[a] defendant is constitutionally entitled to relief
when the State breaches a promise made to him in return for a guilty plea.” Jafek, 141 Idaho at
74 (citation omitted).  “This principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the
fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent.” State v.
Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).
If the prosecution has breached its promise given in a plea agreement, whether
that  breach  was  intentional  or  inadvertent,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  defendant’s
plea was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead guilty on
a false premise.  In such event, the defendant will be entitled to relief.  As a
remedy, the court may order specific performance of the agreement or may permit
the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea.
Id. (citations omitted); see also McAmis v. State, 155 Idaho 796, 798 (Ct. App. 2013) (explaining
that when the State breaches a plea agreement, “the trial court has discretion to either permit the
withdrawal  of  the  defendant’s  guilty  plea  or  order  specific  performance  of  the  plea  agreement
through resentencing before a different judge”).
The State breached its promise to recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three
years  fixed,  and,  as  a  result,  Mr.  Smith’s  plea  was  not  knowing  and  voluntary.   Mr.  Smith  is
entitled to either be resentenced by a different judge, or to withdraw his guilty plea.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.  Alternatively, Mr. Smith requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order re: plea agreement breach and sentencing, and remand this case to the
district court with instructions that Mr. Smith be resentenced before a different judge, or be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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